Overcoming Cartesian Intuitions: A Defense of Type-Physicalism
نویسنده
چکیده
Type-physicalism is the view that sensory states and properties are identical with their nomologically correlated brain states and properties. The main challenge to this view is how to overcome conceivability arguments such as the conceivability of disembodiment or of zombiehood. In this paper, I explain how I think the type-physicalist should respond to such arguments. More specifically, I want to argue that even if the separability of, for instance, pain and c-fiber stimulation, is ideally conceivable, this does not show that it is possible.
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