Selecting a Unique Competitive Equilibrium with Default Penalties
نویسندگان
چکیده
The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow default subject to penalties results in a construction of a simple mechanism for selecting a unique competitive equilibrium. We consider economies for which a common credit money can be applied to uniquely select any competitive equilibrium with suitable default penalties. We identify two classes of such economies.
منابع مشابه
A CREDIT MECHANISM FOR SELECTING A UNIQUE COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM By
The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow for default subject to appropriate credit limits and default penalties results in a construction of a simple mechanism for a credit using society. We show that there generically exists a price-normalizing bundle that determines a credit money along with appropriate credit limits and default penalties for the credit mechanism to selec...
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