On Propositions and Fineness of Grain ( Again ! ) 1 Jeffrey

On Propositions and Fineness of Grain (Again!) Jeffrey C. King Rutgers University What I plan to do in the present paper is, first, sketch the theory of propositions I defended in a recent book I coauthored with Scott Soames and Jeff Speaks. Second, I want to respond to a criticism of that view raised by Peter Hanks [2015]. Finally, I want to discuss some changes in my view since the publication of King, Soames, Speaks [2014]. Before all that, let me begin by motivating my view of propositions and describing how I came to hold it. In the mid 1990s, I began thinking about the metaphysics of propositions. I became convinced that any theory of propositions worth that epithet had to provide an explanation of how/why propositions have truth conditions. In my first papers on this topic in the mid 1990’s, I made clear that I viewed explaining how/why propositions have truth conditions or represent the world as being a certain way as an important desideratum for a theory of propositions. I’ll say more about this below. By that time, I had also become convinced that some version of the neoRussellian view of propositions as structured entities was correct. So I took it that propositions were some sort of complexes with what are usually considered their constituents as parts. Thus, the proposition that Sophie skis is some sort of complex consisting of Sophie and the property of skiing being structured in some way in the proposition. Combining this idea with the previous thought that we must provide some