Anomalous Panpsychism: A New Solution to the Mind-Body Problem∗
نویسنده
چکیده
A satisfactory solution to the mind-problem should answer the two following questions: i) are phenomenal properties, the properties that characterize states of consciousness, physical? ii) how do phenomenal properties causally interact with physical properties? To a first approximation, physicalism and dualism are the two possible answers to the first question. There are three kinds of views regarding causal interactions between phenomenal and physical properties: nomism (they interact through deterministic laws), acausalism (they do not causally interact), and anomalism (they interact, but not through deterministic laws). In this paper, I explore anomalous dualism, a combination of views that has not previously been explored. I suggest that a kind of anomalous dualism, nonreductive anomalous panpsychism, ∗Thanks to Angela Mendelovici for her extensive feedback on multiple drafts of this paper. This paper will appear in The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism edited by William Seager (expected 2018).
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