Backward Induction without Common Knowledge
نویسنده
چکیده
منابع مشابه
TR-2010010: Robust Knowledge and Rationality
In 1995, Aumann proved that in games of perfect information, common knowledge of rationality yields backward induction. In 1998, Stalnaker provided an example of a game in which common knowledge of rationality, once belief revision is taken into account, does not yield backward induction. However, in some pertinent situations in this example, players are allowed to forfeit the rationality condi...
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In 1995, Aumann proved that in games of perfect information, common knowledge of rationality yields backward induction. In 1998, Stalnaker provided an example of a game in which common knowledge of rationality, once belief revision is taken into account, does not yield backward induction. However, in some pertinent situations in this example, players are allowed to forfeit the rationality condi...
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Stalnaker provided an example of a perfect information game in which common knowledge of rationality does not yield backward induction. However, in his example, knowledge is treated as defeasible: players forfeit their knowledge of rationality at some vertices. This is not how ‘knowledge’ is understood in epistemology where, unlike belief, it is not subject to revision. In this respect, the Sta...
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Stalnaker provided an example of a perfect information game in which common knowledge of rationality does not yield backward induction. However, in his example, knowledge is treated as defeasible: players forfeit their knowledge of rationality at some vertices. This is not how ‘knowledge’ is understood in epistemology where, unlike belief, it is not subject to revision. In this respect, the Sta...
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In a well-known, controversial paper, Professor Robert J. Aumann (1995) gave a formal presentation and a proof of the claim, that in games with perfect information, common knowledge of rationality implies that the backward induction outcome is reached. What keeps the players in Aumann’s model from deviating from the backward induction path is the following. Each player knows that if he deviates...
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