Health insurance: tradeoffs revisited.
نویسندگان
چکیده
In two recent papers, [Journal of Health Economics 18(2), 141-152, Journal of Health Economics 18(6), 811-824] Nyman raised some questions about the welfare calculations and conclusions in our earlier paper [Manning and Marquis, Health insurance: the tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard, Vol. 15, 1996]. This note discusses the erroneous criticisms in his papers. First, although, we estimated a Marshallian demand curve, our calculations are based on compensating variations that incorporate the gains from risk pooling. Second, our estimates of second best insurance plans indicate that some cost sharing is optimal, in contradiction to his assertion that our results raise questions about the desirability of insurance coverage. The comment also deals with other issues raised by Nyman.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Journal of health economics
دوره 20 2 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2001