Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice

نویسندگان

  • María D. García-Sanz
  • José Carlos Rodriguez Alcantud
چکیده

This paper contributes to the theory of rational choice under sequential criteria. Following the approach initiated by Manzini and Mariotti (2007) for single-valued choice functions, we characterize choice correspondences that are rational by two sequential criteria under a mild consistency axiom. Rationales ensuring the sequential rationalization are explicitly constructed and a uniquely determined, canonical solution is provided.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Mathematical Social Sciences

دوره 74  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2015