Differential Information Economies: Contract Based Approach, Core and Equilibria

This is a purely theoretical project aimed at studying economic models with asymmetric information. The construction and study of the models of this type are a problem of great theoretical significance developing microeconomic theory and the theory of general economic equilibrium. Our analysis is based on a contractual approach proposed and developed by Marakulin in a series of papers. Studies have shown (e.g. see Marakulin, 2009, 2011) that this approach works efficiently and has great potential for further development. Its main advantage is that it presents a new model of perfect competition, the simplest among those seen in the literature and expressed in a flexible form in the permitting of partial breaking of contracts (barter, production, etc.) and subsequent consideration of stable webs of contracts. By not addressing to value categories, one can describe equilibrium allocations in many economic models: pure exchange, with the production of Arrow-Debreu type and public goods, incomplete markets and etc. Thus, the project is developing previously started investigations of economies with asymmetric information in the general context of the contractual approach.