DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs

A generalization of the Shapley-Ichiishi result

The Shapley-Ichiishi result states that a game is convex if and only if the convex hull of marginal vectors equals the core. In this paper we generalize this result by distinguishing equivalence classes of balanced games that share the same core structure. We then associate a system of linear inequalities with each equivalence class, and we show that the system defines the class. Application of...

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES Local Spillovers, Convexity and the Strategic Substitutes Property in Networks

We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise equilibrium networks. Moreover, our existence proof allows us to characterize a pairwise equilibrium of thes...

A Theoretical Analysis of the Role of Social Networks in Entrepreneurship Department of Economics Working Paper Series

Nber Working Paper Series a Welfare Criterion for Models with Distorted Beliefs

This paper proposes a welfare criterion for economies in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs. Instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct, our criterion asserts that an allocation is belief-neutral efficient (inefficient) if it is efficient (inefficient) under any convex combination of agents' beliefs. While this criterion gives an incomplete ranking of social allocatio...

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES (Non-)Existence and Scope of Nash Networks

For the connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay, specific parameter configurations are given for which Nash networks do not exist. Moreover, existence and the scope of Nash network architectures are briefly discussed. JEL Classification: C72, D85