How to Individuate Concepts

This paper challenges the beliefs that: 1) theories of concept individuation can reveal information about concept ontology, and 2) some such theories are better than others. It is concerned with answering the following question: what basis do we have to compare different theories of concept individuation? Arguments from intuitions; ability to explain behaviour; and fit with the natural world are considered. It is argued that none of these features provides grounds for choosing one theory of individuation over another, and certainly does not identify which is the best or most ‘correct’ model of concept individuation. An alternative is suggested: comparing theories of concept individuation on the basis of how useful they are. It is argued that the success of a theory of concept individuation should be measured in terms of its pragmatic value relative to a particular frameworks of goals. It is concluded, no theory of concept individuation can be objectively correct, or better than any other, independent of an account of its usefulness.