Supplier Encroachment Under Asymmetric Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
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منابع مشابه
On supplier encroachment with retailer's fairness concerns
With the development of e-commerce, many wholesale suppliers establish direct channels competing with their retailers. Such competition is often referred to as supplier encroachment. Previous studies assume the perfect rationality of retailers. However, supplier encroachment may trigger the fairness concerns of the retailers as a supplier is also a competitor of its retailer if the supplier enc...
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A supply chain system is studied, in which the information about the retailer’s storage cost is usually asymmetric. This paper studies the inventory control in the system and presents a quantity discount pricing model for inventory coordination based on the standard container, a transport tool from the supplier to the retailer with a fixed size. First, it investigates the inventory models under...
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In the supply-chain literature, an increasing body of work studies how suppliers can use incentive schemes such as quantity discounts to influence buyers’ ordering behaviour, thus reducing the supplier’s (and the total supply chain’s) costs. Various functional forms for such incentive schemes have been proposed, but a critical assumption always made is that the supplier has full information abo...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Management Science
دوره 60 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014