A Characterization of n-Player Strongly Monotone Scheduling Mechanisms
نویسندگان
چکیده
Our work deals with the important problem of globally characterizing truthful mechanisms where players have multi-parameter, additive valuations, like scheduling unrelated machines or additive combinatorial auctions. Very few mechanisms are known for these settings and the question is: Can we prove that no other truthful mechanisms exist? We characterize truthful mechanisms for n players and 2 tasks or items, as either task-independent, or a player-grouping minimizer, a new class of mechanisms we discover, which generalizes affine minimizers. We assume decisiveness, strong monotonicity and that the truthful payments1 are continuous functions of players’ bids.
منابع مشابه
Extending Characterizations of Truthful Mechanisms from Subdomains to Domains
The already extended literature in Combinatorial Auctions, Public Projects and Scheduling demands a more systematic classification of the domains and a clear comparison of the results known. Connecting characterization results for different settings and providing a characterization proof using another characterization result as a black box without having to repeat a tediously similar proof is n...
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