A proportional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
نویسنده
چکیده
We introduce a solution concept for cooperative game with transferable utility and a coalition structure that is proportional for two-player games. Our value is obtained from generalizing a proportional value for cooperative game with transferable utility (Ortmann, 2000) in a way that parallels the extension of the Shapley value to the Owen value. We provide two characterizations of our solution concept, one that employs a property that can be seen as the proportional analogue to Myersons balanced contribution property; and a second one that relies on a consistency property.
منابع مشابه
A modified position value for communication situations and its fuzzification
Myerson treated various situations of cooperation in the field of cooperative games and proposed the communication structure. In this paper, we define and characterize an allocation rule in terms of the position value, called an average spanning tree solution, for communication situations by introducing a concept of cooperation relationship which says that two players are deemed to possess this...
متن کاملThe Banzhaf-Owen value for fuzzy games with a coalition structure
In this paper, a generalized form of the Banzhaf-Owen value for cooperative fuzzy games with a coalition structure is proposed. Its axiomatic system is given by extending crisp case. In order to better understand the Banzhaf-Owen value for fuzzy games with a coalition structure, we briefly introduce the Banzhaf-Owen values for two special kinds of fuzzy games with a coalition structure, and giv...
متن کاملCooperative games on convex geometries with a coalition structure
This paper is mainly to discuss cooperative games on convex geometries with a coalition structure, which can be seen as an extension of cooperative games with a coalition structure. For this kind of games, the cooperation among unions and within each union will be the convex sets, i.e., the feasible subsets of the coalition structure and that of each union belong to a convex geometry, respectiv...
متن کاملCooperative Benefit and Cost Games under Fairness Concerns
Solution concepts in cooperative games are based on either cost games or benefit games. Although cost games and benefit games are strategically equivalent, that is not the case in general for solution concepts. Motivated by this important observation, a new property called invariance property with respect to benefit/cost allocation is introduced in this paper. Since such a property can be regar...
متن کاملThe Owen Value for Fuzzy Games with a Coalition Structure
In this paper, we make a study of the Owen value for cooperative fuzzy games with a coalition structure, which can be regarded as the generalization of crisp case. An axiomatic system of the Owen value for fuzzy games with a coalition structure is obtained by extending the corresponding characterizations given by Owen. The relationship between the Owen value and the fuzzy core of fuzzy games wi...
متن کامل