Practical Reasoning and Criminal Responsibility: A Jurisprudential Approach

ing the reasoning offender in this way, Norrie argues, makes it possible to treat the offender as an isolated, responsible agent. And because rational choice approaches may similarly appear to decontextualize criminal reasoning they give further credence to justice model approaches. More importantly, by neglecting the broader social context in this way, rational choice approaches may encourage simplistic situational solutions to crime which, instead of reducing, merely displace it. The issues are complex and not resolvable within this short space. Our own view would be, first, that a concept of human reasoning as "situated" is not only compatible with but given explicit recognition in a rational choice approach. It is true that event models, considered alone and out of context, might seem to encourage that image of the offender to which Norrie objects. The reason, however, is that the variables with which they deal relate primarily to the restricted and immediate strategic issues of crime commission itself (cf. Carroll and Weaver). Each event, however, is linked to a previous (new, standing, or revised) involvement decision sequence, and it is there, where wider social forces and personal histories have most impact on decision making, that the situated nature of practical reasoning is most clearly to be appreciated and structural