The blurred boundaries of functional reference: a response to Scarantino & Clay

The past years have shown a resurgence of interest in conceptual issues in animal communication, with much of the debate centering on the concept of information (e.g. Carazo & Font, 2010; Rendall, Owren,& Ryan, 2009; Ruxton& Schaefer, 2011; Scarantino, 2010; Scott-Phillips, 2008; Seyfarth et al., 2010), and whether the identification of so-called ‘functional reference’ contributes to a better understanding of linguistic reference, and ultimately the evolution of speech (Fedurek & Slocombe, 2011; Manser, 2013; Townsend & Manser, 2013; Wheeler & Fischer, 2012). Scarantino and Clay's (2015; hereafter S&C) Forum article in this issue continues this debate, and is largely a response to a recent paper of ours (Wheeler& Fischer, 2012). In our original paper, we contended that all cases of animal communication in which receiver responses could be explained in terms of the information provided by the signal could be said to function referentially. According to most definitions, this applies to the entire spectrum of animal communication (see Rendall et al., 2009). Because the boundaries of ‘functional reference’ have been blurred to a degree where it is no