J. KEVIN O’REGAN - ERIK MYIN - ALVA NOË TOWARDS AN ANALYTIC PHENOMENOLOGY: THE CONCEPTS OF “BODILINESS” AND “GRABBINESS” 1. Phenomenal Consciousness

In this paper, we present an account of phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is experience, and the problem of phenomenal consciousness is to explain how physical processes – behavioral, neural, computational – can produce experience. Numerous thinkers have argued that phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained in functional, neural or information processing terms (e. Different arguments have been put forward. For example, it has been argued that two individuals could be exactly alike in func-tional/computational/behavioral measures, but differ in the character of their experience. Though such persons would behave in the same way, they would differ in how things felt to them (for example, red things might give rise to the experience in one that green things give rise to in the other). Similarly, it has been held that two individuals could be functionally/computationally/be-haviorally alike although one of them, but not the other, is a mere zombie, that is, a robot-like creature who acts as if it has experience but is in fact phenomenally unconsciousness. For any being, it has been suggested, the question whether it has experience (is phenomenally conscious) cannot be answered by deter