Truth without contra(di)Ction

If P , doesn’t it follow that ‘P ’ is true? And if ‘P ’ is true, doesn’t it follow that P? Well, that arguably depends. If I am hungry, it does not follow that your utterance of the sentence ‘I am hungry’ is true—you might well not be hungry, in which case your utterance would intuitively be false. It is not even clear whether and in what sense it follows that the sentence ‘I am hungry’ is true—if I am hungry and you are not hungry why should the sentence ‘I am hungry’ give more weight to my hunger than to your satiety (see Zardini [2008], pp. 545–561; [2010a])? Moreover, it might seem possible (albeit not actual) that there are no linguistic entities. But, if there were no linguistic entities, it is not very clear whether and in what sense it would follow that ‘There are no linguistic entities’ is true.