A Symmetric Two-Player All-Pay Contest with Correlated Information1
نویسندگان
چکیده
We construct both monotonic and non-monotonic symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria for a two-player all-pay contest with binary types and correlated information structures. We also employ a class of parametric distributions to illustrate our equilibrium construction explicitly and to derive some comparative statics results. JEL classi cations: C72, D44, D72, D82.
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