Neutral monism reconsidered

combinatorial relations between them simply come along for free. Which among all these abstract possibilities are concretely instantiated by physics, for example by genuine causal connections between objects? Russell readily admitted this criticism (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1989; Seager, 2006), but Newman is actually endorsing Russell’s real proposal for an enhanced physicalism, in which causal dispositions are concretely instantiated by qualities and are not just abstract combinations of objects. It is this proposal for an enhanced physicalism that most authors have taken from the quote. Rather than canvass all of the different proposals cited above, I will make use of David Chalmer’s (2003) concise summary in which he dubs the Neo-Russellian position ‘Type-F monism’. According to Chalmers: Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions. On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . . As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws. The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature . . . (proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation. (Chalmers, 2003, p. 265) These ‘categorical properties’ are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009). They have both an intrinsic, or concrete, aspect as real qualities, and they have also the relational or dispositional aspect as it is known in physics. Thesis number four above seems completely satisfied by Type F-Monism. On the other hand, these categorical properties are what Chalmers calls ‘‘(proto) phenomenal properties’’ inside of even the smallest parts of matter, a suggestion with disturbing panpsychist overtones. As the physical stuff combines, according to physical laws, into ever more complex structures like the brain, these tiny protophenomenal properties inside matter combine into conscious experience and sensation. Chalmers suggests that there must be principles for how these protophenomenal properties combine, which would run in parallel with, but be independent of, the way that the physical dispositions combine: This is . . . the combination problem for panpsychism. To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or from protophenomenal properties. (Chalmers, 2003, p. 266) Philosophical Psychology 181 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B a n k s , E r i k C . ] A t : 1 6 : 5 2 2 3 A p r i l 2 0 1 0 Why would we need two completely different, parallel orders of composition if the protophenomenal properties are exactly the occupants of the known causal roles of physics? Won’t the principles of combination be just the same? I can’t see how there could be a second ordering besides that by which physical dispositions ordinarily configure by known physical laws. Moreover the idea that physical dispositions in matter are little ‘‘proto-sensations’’ seems wrong, much less proto-sensations in little ‘‘proto-egos’’ (Strawson, 2006). Elements are concrete instantiations of physical dispositions, but they are not all sensations, or even possible sensations, and they certainly don’t depend on there being little egos to perceive them. So Type-F monism appears to lack features of classic neutral monism already. Instead, as outlined above, why not let the phenomenal properties (sensations) be the concrete instantiations of higher order dispositions, while the lower-level physical dispositions are concretely instantiated by physical elements in matter that are not anyone’s sensations, nor related to them by a line of descent? Here, Chalmers explicitly rejects the notion that a sensation quality might be intrinsic ‘‘to high level physical dispositions (e.g., those involved in neural states)’’: If the low-level network is causally closed and the high level intrinsic properties are not constituted by low-level intrinsic properties, the high level intrinsic properties will be epiphenomenal. The only way to embrace this position would seem to be in combination with a denial of microphysical causal closure, holding that there are fundamental dispositions above the microphysical level which have phenomenal properties as their grounds. (Chalmers, 2003, p. 267) I give him credit for seeing the possibility, but he, too, has fallen for the one-size-fits-all notion of causation criticized above. This prevents him from seeing the appeal of making sensations the instantiation of higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons. Given that we are still owed a definition of causation, why is it impossible that a configuration of elements instantiating a cluster of micro-physical dispositions might not also collectively instantiate a disposition of the cluster as a whole? There is no need for a mysterious line of descent from conscious sensation to inorganic matter by which protophenomenal properties combine by a set of weird laws into conscious phenomenal properties; we can just stick with physics and its laws, complemented by further empirical laws describing the higher order dispositions of configurations of neurons. Lockwood (1993) addresses this point explicitly: Their [basic dispositions of matter] potential for generating awareness could be a matter of the application of certain currently unknown laws to their familiar physical attributes (in which laws, of course, there would be an essential reference to the emergent attributes). This fairly elementary point seems to have escaped those authors who have argued that, if we are made of electrons, quarks, gluons, and the like, then—given that we are conscious—electrons, quarks and so forth must themselves be possessed of some sort of primitive proto-consciousness. As I see it, this is a complete non-sequitur (p. 281). I would say that instead of a bogus ‘composition problem’ for neutral monism, the principle of causal closure and the lack of any nuanced definition of ‘cause’ seems to 182 E. C. Banks D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ B a n k s , E r i k C . ] A t : 1 6 : 5 2 2 3 A p r i l 2 0 1 0 be the real problem. There is a need for a better understanding of multi-level causation and the variety of causal dispositions that exist to be concretely instantiated in nature by elements and element/sensations, both lower and higher level ‘attributes’, on the causal map of nature. This is a problem for the philosophy of science, which is not a bad result; at least we are learning where to locate the problem correctly.