Stable Winning Coalitions
نویسنده
چکیده
We introduce the notion of a stable winning coalition in a multiplayer game as a new system of classification of games. An axiomatic refinement of this classification for three-player games is also presented. These classifications are compared in light of a probabilistic model and the existing literature.
منابع مشابه
2 00 9 Power indices and minimal winning coalitions Werner Kirsch and Jessica Langner
The Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in a voting system. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula to calculate both indices solely using the set of minimal winning c...
متن کامل2 00 9 Power indices and minimal winning coalitions Werner Kirsch and Jessica Langner June 21 , 2009
The Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in a voting system. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula to calculate both indices solely using the set of minimal winning c...
متن کاملPower Indices and minimal winning Coalitions
The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula how to calculate both indices solely using the set of m...
متن کامل2 00 9 Power indices and minimal winning coalitions
The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula how to calculate both indices solely using the set of m...
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