A Theory of the Evolution of Voting: Turnout Dynamics and the Importance of Groups

Rational actor game theoretic models have had a longstanding challenge trying to explain voter turnout in the mass electorate. We analyze how partial turnout can be addressed and predicted by mechanisms in evolutionary game theory. We present two models at opposite ends of the spectrum of possible evolutionary models and show realistic partial voter turnout can be generated by either. The first model is strongly rooted in common evolutionary models of preprogrammed, non-rational automata who play strategies blindly but are subject to group pressures and a selection mechanism. The second model has actors who closely resemble voters in classic Downsian models, with policy preferences, distances to candidates, and voter calculus, but again using evolutionary game theory we explicitly model group pressures and a selection mechanism. That both these models generate partial turnout, shows the importance of group dynamics in mass political behavior, and the importance of explicitly addressing group pressures and selection mechanisms.