A Defense of First-Order Representationalist Theories of Mental- State Consciousness
نویسنده
چکیده
Recently, Peter Carruthers has advanced the debate over first-order representationalist theories (FORs) and higher-order representationalist theories (HORs) of consciousness by offering two innovative arguments in support of dispositionalist HORs. In this article, I offer a limited defense of actualist FORs by showing that Carruthers' two arguments either beg the question against such accounts, equivocate on important concepts, or rest on suspect claims about our abilities to attribute phenomenal consciousness to animals. In addition, I argue that dispositionalist HORs face an apparent counterexample, one which Carruthers does not consider.
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