Estimating the Effect of Leisure on Judicial Performance∗

Past research suggests federal judges confront incentives that undermine the speed and quality with which they resolve cases when leisure interests are particularly strong. Alternatively, the selection process for federal judges, which seeks to identify intrinsically motivated individuals, as well as judges’ own desire for prestige—commonly tied to the quality of their work—may considerably mitigate this concern. The challenge with empirically evaluating these claims lies in measuring latent preferences for leisure. We take advantage of an annual sporting event that creates differential distractions across judges. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show a judge’s alma mater’s participation in the NCAA Mens’ Basketball Tournament both slows the rate at which opinions are drafted and ultimately undermines opinion quality, even accounting for the additional time judges spend writing the opinion. The findings have implications for the tradeoff between judicial independence and accountability and reinforce the importance of the recruitment of high quality judges. ∗We thank Chuck Cameron, Adam Glynn, Thomas Gschwend, Kosuke Imai, and John Kastellec for helpful suggestions and guidance. †Department of Political Science, Emory University ‡Center for Doctoral Studies in Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Mannheim §Department of Political Science, Emory University