Interests and Animals, Needs and Language

In Interests and Rights / The Case Against Animals /1 R. G. Frey believes he has animal rights advocates firmly skewered on the horns of a dilemma: (1) Animal rights advocates agree that "all and only beings which (can) have interests (can) have moral rights. " Frey labels this "the interest requirement. "2 (2) Interests must be divided into needs and desi res. 3 (3) If "interests" in (1) refers to needs, then plants, tractors, cave drawings, and other mere things (can) have interests and / consequently / (can) have moral rights (at least as far as the interest requi rement is concerned) . But this is so counter-intuitive as to be unacceptable even to animal rights advocates. 4 (4) If "interests" in (1) refers to desires, animals can­ not have them and, conse­ quently / cannot have moral rights. Animals cannot have desi res because (a) having desires requires beliefs or self-consciousness, (b) both of these require linguistic ability, but (c) animals lack linguistic ability.5 Thus, Frey claims that a careful anal­ ysis of "interests" shows that the claim that animals (can) have moral rights either leads to absurdity or is false.