A comparison of punishment rules in repeated public good games: An experimental study
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment. Moreover, we present evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution and profit levels, as well as justice. Finally, we investigate influences crucial to participants’ support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo. We show that beside profit differences the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.
منابع مشابه
Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment - An experimental study∗
This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long, finitely repeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring environment, increasing the severity of the potential punishment monotonically increases both contributions and the average net payoffs of subjects. In a more realistic imperfect monitoring environme...
متن کاملPositive interactions promote public cooperation.
The public goods game is the classic laboratory paradigm for studying collective action problems. Each participant chooses how much to contribute to a common pool that returns benefits to all participants equally. The ideal outcome occurs if everybody contributes the maximum amount, but the self-interested strategy is not to contribute anything. Most previous studies have found punishment to be...
متن کاملPunishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?
A number of experimental studies have shown that the opportunity to punish anti-social behavior increases cooperation levels when agents face a social dilemma. Using a public good experiment, I show that in the presence of counter-punishment opportunities cooperators are less willing to punish free riders. As a result, cooperation breaks down and groups have lower earnings in comparison to a tr...
متن کاملWhen Punishment Pays
Explaining cooperation in groups remains a key problem because reciprocity breaks down between more than two. Punishing individuals who contribute little provides a potential answer but changes the dilemma to why pay the costs of punishing which, like cooperation itself, provides a public good. Nevertheless, people are observed to punish others in behavioural economic games, posing a problem fo...
متن کاملComparing flow experience of medical students in cognitive, behavioral, and social educational games: A quasi-experimental study
Background & Objective: This study contributed to the current body of literature on educational games by comparing medical students’ flow experience in three types of educational games developed based on three learning theories: behavioral, cognitive, and social. Materials & Methods: A quasi-experimental repeated measure design was employed. A total of 39 second-year medical students played th...
متن کامل