The Chances of Successful Attacks against Continuous-time Mixes
نویسندگان
چکیده
Continuous-time mixes represent a relatively new field in anonymity services. Their simplicity and probabilistic approach suggest promising results. In this paper their two most recent representatives, the SG Mix and the PROB Channel will be analysed. The aim of this paper is twofold: first it will be shown via analytical means that considering a locally back-tracing observer and the source-hiding property as anonymity measure, the PROB Channel outperforms the SG Mix for MIN/MAX senders in practically relevant scenarios. Then results of simulations will confirm the theoretical arguments.
منابع مشابه
On the Effectiveness of Continuous-Time Mixes under Flow Correlation Attacks
ABSTRACT To achieve anonymity in open environments such as the Internet, special proxies, denoted as mixes, were proposed to relay messages for senders and receivers. A mix may delay, batch and reorder packets to disrupt the packet-level timing correlation of packets into and out of the mix. Often multiple mixes are grouped into a mix network, which preserves anonymity in presence of compromise...
متن کاملFrom a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
The literature contains a variety of different mixes, some of which have been used in deployed anonymity systems. We explore their anonymity and message delay properties, and show how to mount active attacks against them by altering the traffic between the mixes. We show that if certain mixes are used, such attacks cannot destroy the anonymity of a particular message completely. We work out the...
متن کاملA Defense Against Replay Attacks on Chaumian Mixes
This paper describes the replay attack against traditional and channel-based Chaumian mixes and puts it into context with other attacks on anonymizing services. It then evaluates different possible approaches to a defense against said attack, concentrating on the question of efficiently recognizing potentially compromised messages within a channel-based cascade of mixes. Finally, an exemplary i...
متن کاملA new security proof for FMNV continuous non-malleable encoding scheme
A non-malleable code is a variant of an encoding scheme which is resilient to tampering attacks. The main idea behind non-malleable coding is that the adversary should not be able to obtain any valuable information about the message. Non-malleable codes are used in tamper-resilient cryptography and protecting memories against tampering attacks. Many different types of non-malleability have alre...
متن کاملOn Blending Attacks For Mixes with Memory Extended Version
Blending attacks are a general class of traffic-based attacks, exemplified by the (n − 1)-attack. Adding memory or pools to mixes mitigates against such attacks, however there are few known quantitative results concerning the effect of pools on blending attacks. In this paper we give a precise analysis of the number of rounds required to perform a blending attack for the pool mix, timed pool mi...
متن کامل