Random Matching in the College Admissions Problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilbria. Namely, every ordinal equilibrium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium outcome, while stability is guaranteed in ordinal equilibrium where rms act straightforwardly. Finally, we relate equilibrium behavior in random and in deterministic mechanisms. JEL Classi cation: C78
منابع مشابه
Mechanisms : Student - optimality vs
1. Abstract The college admissions problem is an example of a two-sided matching market. Even though it is closely-related to the stable marriage problem, it is in fact not equivalent. However, the problems are similar enough that the mechanisms used to solve them share some properties—the mechanisms are only guaranteed to produce an optimal stable outcome for one of the parties, but not both. ...
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