Focal points in bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
نویسنده
چکیده
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is characterized by three axioms: balanced focal point, disagreement point monotonicity, and restricted IIA.
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تاریخ انتشار 2012