Effect of defectors for cooperation: how strictly should defectors be eliminated from the newcomers?
نویسندگان
چکیده
Yamamoto et. al.[6] have discovered that cooperation can be robustly maintained in a metanorms game by introducing into the population a small number of agents that always act non-cooperatively. They call this a "social vaccine" effect. In this paper we focus on the implications of a social vaccine. We therefore consider a model where there is a constant ow of newcomers into the population. How strictly should non-cooperators be eliminated from the newcomers in such a model? In this paper, by assuming a case where cooperative participants and non-cooperative participants are trying to participate in a population where metanorms are functioning, we investigate how well cooperation within the population is maintained by a strict population management policy where only cooperative participants are allowed to participate, and a simple population management policy where non-cooperative participants are admitted to some extent.
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