Nash equilibria set computing in finite extended games
نویسنده
چکیده
The Nash equilibria set (NES) is described as an intersection of graphs of best response mappings. The problem of NES computing for multi-matrix extended games is considered. A method for NES computing is studied. Mathematics Subject Classification 2000: 91A05, 91A06, 91A10, 91A44, 90C05, 90C31, 90C90.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- The Computer Science Journal of Moldova
دوره 14 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006