Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching Markets*
نویسندگان
چکیده
Theoretical work on two-sided matching markets has focussed on the stable outcomes that are optimal for one side of the market. An innovative exception is a paper by Rochford, who shows how to identify a nonempty set of interior points of the core of the assignment market first studied by Shapley and Shubik. We strengthen Rochfold’s results, by showing that such a set of fixed points must reflect the same kind of polarization of interests that characterizes the core, and generalize these results to a wider class of markets, via a powerful algebraic fixed point theorem of Tarski. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 022, 026. r!” 1988 Academic Press. Inc.
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