Josh Weisberg Introduction
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چکیده
Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic is a unique contribution to consciousness studies. The book presents a detailed and far-ranging debate between psychologist Russell T. Hurlburt, developer and defender of the Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) method of introspective reporting, and philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel, whose sceptical work challenges the accuracy of any introspective method. It is the format of the work that is especially distinctive: the authors examine the reliability of DES by actually engaging in the method, interviewing a single introspecting subject, given the pseudonym Melanie, over the course six sampling days. This hands-on approach effectively brings out the real-time challenges facing introspective methods, while providing a fruitful entry-point into a number of key empirical and philosophical questions in consciousness studies. But just as importantly, the energetic interplay between Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel, even when they disagree, helps clarify what is at stake in this complex debate, very much in the style of Socratic dialogue. The work is among the best examples of interdisciplinary research in consciousness studies. This special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies extends both the spirit and scope of Describing Inner Experience. Ten invited commentaries from leading researchers in philosophy and psychology challenge both Hurlburt’s impassioned defence of DES and Schwitzgebel’s persistent sceptical worries about introspection. The debate moves in new and interesting directions, and problems initially brought out in the book receive extended treatment. Further, the forum allows both Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel to clarify, refine, and, occasionally, reformulate their positions on the complex issues raised in Describing Inner Experience . Their replies here form a seamless
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PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ Reply to Weisberg: No direction home—searching for neutral ground
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تاریخ انتشار 2011