Belief and normativity
نویسنده
چکیده
The thesis that mental content is normative is ambiguous and has many forms. This article deals only with the thesis that normativity is connected to our mental attitudes rather than with the content of the attitudes, and more specifically with the view that it is connected to belief. A number of writers have proposed various versions of a ‘norm of truth’ attached to belief. I examine various versions of this claim, and defend it against recent criticisms according to which this norm lacks normative force, that it violates the principle that ‘ought implies can,’ and that it is viciously circular. I defend the view that we should distinguish the statement of the objective norm and the way it is regulated, and that this distinction can answer most of the criticisms of the norm of truth for belief.
منابع مشابه
An Investigation of Norm of Belief’s Proper Formulation
That falsity is a defect in belief can be captured with a prohibitive norm holding that truth is the necessary condition for permissibility of belief. Furthermore, such a formulation avoids the difficulties encountered in earlier literature that offered prescriptive norms. The normativity of belief thesis is widely discussed in the literature. I criticise bi-conditional formulation of the norm ...
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تز هنجارمندیِ محتوایِ ذهنی از مباحث بسیار تأثیرگذار در فلسفۀ ذهن معاصر بوده است. پل بگوسیان به تز هنجارمندیِ محتوا استدلالی بر اساسِ دو پیش فرض ارائه نموده است: اول آنکه باور مفهومی هنجارمند است و دوم آنکه باور نسبت به آرزو اولویتِ مفهومی دارد. الکساندر میلر در مقالۀ اخیر خود استدلال بگوسیان را مورد نقد قرار داده است. برای تقریرِ این نقد، الکساندر میلر استدلال نموده که پیش فرض دومِ استدلالِ بگوسیان...
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