Intersubjectivity and interaction as crucial for understanding the moral role of shame: a critique of TOSCA-based shame research

In recent years, a view on two key moral emotions, shame and guilt, seems to be establishing itself in some sectors of psychology, based mainly on the research of Tangney and Dearing (2004) and their “Test of Self-Conscious Affect” (TOSCA). On this view, guilt is a productive force in our moral lives, while shame is morally counterproductive and psychologically harmful. Therefore, one should cultivate guilt and fight shame. But this conclusion is problematic for two main reasons, among others. On the one hand, the distinction that grounds it is too simplistic: the boundary between guilt and shame is farmore blurry and complex than this account acknowledges. On the other hand, it operates on a functionalistic definition of morality, where “moral” means “prosocial,” which is ultimately insufficient to account for the moral role of these emotions. The functionalistic approach neither does justice to the self-conscious aspects of guilt and shame nor to the interactive dimensions of morality, as a shared practice we engage in with others (Calhoun, 2004).