Do Constitutional Rights Matter?∗

The critique of constitutions as mere parchment barriers is as old as the practice of writing them down. Yet states put a good deal of energy into drafting constitutions and some, inevitably, do so with the intention of abiding by their provisions. The purpose of the following article is to explore this possibility. I develop a theory of constitutional enforcement and test it using data spanning 189 countries from 1981 to 2008. The results suggest that entrenching a human right in the constitution can, under certain circumstances, significantly improve the odds that a country will observe that right in practice. To be specific, I find that constitutional rights are most effective in authoritarian contexts when there is at least a modest level of judicial independence. This finding suggests that the relationship between constitutional promises and actual practice is stronger than generally assumed. ∗Special thanks to Tom Ginsburg for commenting on numerous drafts of this article. I also thank Justin Blount, Daniel Brinks, Christian Davenport, Zachary Elkins, Milan Svolik, Mila Versteeg, and Matthew Winters for helpful and thought-provoking comments. †Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Department of Political Science, University College London, 29/31 Tavistock Square, London, WC1H 9QU, United Kingdom.