Action-timing problem with sequential Bayesian belief revision process

نویسندگان

  • Jae-Hyeon Ahn
  • John J. Kim
چکیده

We consider the problem of deciding the best action time when observations are made sequentially. Specifically we address a special type of optimal stopping problem where observations are made from state-contingent distributions and there exists uncertainty on the state. In this paper, the decision-maker's belief on state is revised sequentially based on the previous observations. By using the independence property of the observations from a given distribution, the sequential Bayesian belief revision process is represented as a simple recursive form. The methodology developed in this paper provides a new theoretical framework for addressing the uncertainty on state in the action-timing problem context. By conducting a simulation analysis, we demonstrate the value of applying Bayesian strategy which uses sequential belief revision process. In addition, we evaluate the value of perfect information to gain more insight on the effects of using Bayesian strategy in the problem. © 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • European Journal of Operational Research

دوره 105  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 1998