Bezalel Peleg , Hans Peters Choosing k from m : feasible elimination procedures reconsidered RM / 14 / 033
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چکیده
We show that feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) can be used to select k from m alternatives. An important advantage of this method is the core property: no coalition can guarantee an outcome that is preferred by all its members. We also provide an axiomatic characterization for the case k = 1, using the conditions of anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking. Finally, we show for any k that outcomes of feasible elimination procedures can be computed in polynomial time, by showing that the problem is computationally equivalent to finding a maximal matching in a bipartite graph. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Nos. C70, D71
منابع مشابه
Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
We show that feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) can be used to select k from m alternatives. An important advantage of this method is the core property: no coalition can guarantee an outcome that is preferred by all its members. We also show that the problem of determining whether a specific k-tuple can result from a feasible elimination procedure is computationally equivalent to the...
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