Equilibria in Noncooperative Models of Competition

نویسندگان

  • NICHOLAS C. YANNELIS
  • Ali Khan
  • Taesung Kim
چکیده

An equilibrium in a game theoretic setting a la Debreu (Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. (I.S.A. 38 (1954). 886893) and Shafer-Sonnenschein (.I. Mar/z. Econ. 2 (1975), 345-348) with a broader structure is proved. In particular, our framework is general enough to encompass both the Aumann (Economefrica 34 (1966), 1-17) economy of perfect competition and the nonordered preferences setting of MasCole11 (J. Math. Econ. 1 (1974), 237-246). Moreover. since the dimensionality of the strategy space may be infinite it contains Bewley-type (J. Econ. Theory 4 (1972), 514540) results and may be useful in obtaining existence results for economies with a measure space of agents and infinitely many commodities. Journal of Economic Liferafurr Classification Numbers: 020, 021, 022. ‘1 1987 Academic Press. Inc

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تاریخ انتشار 2003