Item-Basket Revenue Maximization
نویسندگان
چکیده
Setting prices for items is difficult because one needs to look at prices other substitutable as well as complimentary items. In a co-purchasing network, co-occurence of items can be exploited to tweak item prices for revenue maximization. In our report, we investigate the effects of co-occurrence of items on their prices. In general this problem seems to be NP-Hard. We propose heuristics based on properties of the co-purchasing graph and compare them on the basis of their overall revenue gain and convergence to good solutions.
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تاریخ انتشار 2009