Approximating Exact Budget-Balance with VCG Redistribution Mechanisms
نویسنده
چکیده
In many auction problems, we consider a selfinterested seller who is allocating item(s) to bidders in exchange for payments. The highly celebrated VCG mechanism provides an auction mechanism in this case that is efficient, strategy-proof, and ex post individually rational (IR). If the seller’s goal is to maximize revenue, alternative mechanisms include the Myerson optimal auction, which maximizes the expected payments to the seller. However, we may also consider domains where payments to the seller or auction center is undesirable.
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