Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies0
نویسندگان
چکیده
In a production economy where a single private good is produced via a non-linear concave technology, no direct mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness and efficiency if the preference domain contains the class of linear preferences.
منابع مشابه
Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies
In a production economy where a single private good is produced via a non-linear concave technology, no direct mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness and efficiency if the preference domain contains the class of linear preferences. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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تاریخ انتشار 2003