Discourse coherence and theory of relevance: Stumbling blocks in search of a unified theory

Contrary to Sperber and Wilson (1986), I argue that relevance cannot be the only principle that governs human communication. It can by no means replace current accounts of discourse coherence (e.g., Grice, 1975; van Dijk, 1977; Giora, 1985a,b, 1988), since it is neither necessary nor sufficient for text well-formedness. I show that, although a discourse may be relevant to an individual, interacting with her/his set of assumptions at a small cost, this discourse may nevertheless be judged as incoherent by the very same individual. And vice versa: A discourse may be judged as coherent by an individual and yet be S&W irrelevant to her/him. If one of the goals of a pragmatic theory is to account for speakers' intuitions, Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory is deficient in this respect. It cannot account for speakers' intuitions as to coherence and degrees of coherence. And to feel that the light is a rabbit-light In which everything is meant for you And nothing need be explained ...