Signalling Games: Evolutionary Convergence on Optimality1
نویسندگان
چکیده
Horn’s division of pragmatic labour (Horn, 1984) is a universal property of language, and amounts to the pairing of simple meanings to simple forms, and deviant meanings to complex forms. This division makes sense, but a community of language users that do not know it makes sense will still develop it after a while, because it gives optimal communication at minimal costs. This property of the division of pragmatic labour is shown by formalising it and applying it to a simple form of signalling games, which allows computer simulations to corroborate intuitions. The division of pragmatic labour is a stable communicative strategy that a population of communicating agents will converge on, and it cannot be replaced by alternative strategies once it is in place.
منابع مشابه
Dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary quantum Prisoner's Dilemma games on networks.
The authors proposed a quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game as a natural extension of the classic PD game to resolve the dilemma. Here, we establish a new Nash equilibrium principle of the game, propose the notion of convergence and discover the convergence and phase-transition phenomena of the evolutionary games on networks. We investigate the many-body extension of the game or evolutionary ga...
متن کاملBiology and Evolutionary Games
This chapter surveys some evolutionary games used in biological sciences. These include the Hawk-Dove game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Rock– Paper–Scissors, the war of attrition, the Habitat Selection game, predatorprey games, and signalling games.
متن کاملComparison of AI Techniques for Fighting Action Games - Genetic Algorithms/Neural Networks/Evolutionary Neural Networks
Recently many studies have attempted to implement intelligent characters for fighting action games. They used genetic algorithms, neural networks, and evolutionary neural networks to create intelligent characters. This study quantitatively compared the performance of these three AI techniques in the same game and experimental environments, and analyzed the results of experiments. As a result, n...
متن کاملEvolutionary Learning in Signalling Games
We study equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone two-type signalling games. The learning process we study extends that introduced by Young (1993, Econometrica 61, 57–84) to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles the process gives rise to strong selection among sequential equilibria: if the game has s...
متن کاملApproximating the Geometry of Dynamics in Potential Games: Point-wise Convergence, Regions of Attraction, Average Case Performance Analysis and System Invariants
What does it mean to fully understand the behavior of a network of adaptive agents?The golden standard typically is the behavior of learning dynamics in potential games, wheremany evolutionary dynamics, e.g., replicator dynamics, are known to converge to sets ofequilibria. Even in such classic settings many questions remain unanswered. We examineissues such as:• Point-wi...
متن کامل