Bidding strategy for agents in multi-attribute combinatorial double auction

نویسندگان

  • Faria Nassiri Mofakham
  • Mohammad Ali Nematbakhsh
  • Ahmad Baraani-Dastjerdi
  • Nasser Ghasem-Aghaee
  • Ryszard Kowalczyk
چکیده

In a multi-attribute combinatorial double auction (MACDA), sellers and buyers’ preferences over multiple synergetic goods are best satisfied. In recent studies in MACDA, it is typically assumed that bidders must know the desired combination (and quantity) of items and the bundle price. They do not address a package combination which is the most desirable to a bidder. This study presents a new packaging model called multi-attribute combinatorial bidding (MACBID) strategy and it is used for an agent in either sellers or buyers side of MACDA. To find the combination (and quantities) of the items and the total price which best satisfy the bidder’s need, the model considers bidder’s personality, multi-unit trading item set, and preferences as well as market situation. The proposed strategy is an extension to Markowitz Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and Five Factor Model (FFM) of Personality. We use mkNN learning algorithm and Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) to devise a personality-based multi-attribute combinatorial bid. A test-bed (MACDATS) is developed for evaluating MACBID. This test suite provides algorithms for generating stereotypical artificial market data as well as personality, preferences and item sets of bidders. Simulation results show that the success probability of the MACBID’s proposed bundle for selling and buying item sets are on average 50% higher and error in valuation of package attributes is 5% lower than other strategies. 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Expert Syst. Appl.

دوره 42  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2015