“Linguistic” vs. “Non-Linguistic” Representations: On the Nature of the Theoretical Constructs of the Cognitive Sciences

Within the field of the cognitive sciences (CSs), frequently happened that some form of “linguistic” representations (symbols, propositional representations, and so on) have been opposed to representations of some different kind. In this paper I claim that such an opposition, in spite of its prima facie intuitive strength, cannot be stated in a precise and general way. The possible characterisations of a general notion of “linguistic”, or “symbolic” representation are either too permissive or too vague to turn out to be useful. My thesis is that it is not possible to draw a definitive, a priori and clear-cut distinction that holds once for all, and that can be established on the basis of the analysis of some internal feature of the representations. Rather, in my opinion, similar distinctions must be “negotiated” case by case, and the boundaries between different types of representation are a matter of empirical inquiry.