1 Field : Social Sciences / Humanities Session Topic : Social Choice and

1. Introduction We study the problem of allocating a single indivisible object with monetary transfers among a set of individuals who have mutually different valuations over the object. An interesting public economic example is the locating problem of a Not-In-My-Backyard facility among a group of districts. In this situation, each district (individual) has to bear disutility (negative valuation) when the facility (object) is assigned, so that some fair monetary compensation to the assigned district from the others should be considered. Our position is the arbitrator of the problem, and our purpose is to somehow realize a socially desirable outcome on the basis of individual valuations. The difficulty lies in the typical fact that the arbitrator is not directly involved into the problem, and hence less information over individual valuations is available for him. Our economics-approach to overcome this difficulty is to design an incentive mechanism so that socially desirable outcomes are realized through non-cooperative game-play by individuals. In relation to the title of the session topic, our analysis is about implementing an outcome that should be socially chosen, and the idea of justice is embodied into the criteria of social desirability.