Amendment Voting with Incomplete Preferences : A Revealed Preference Approach to Robust Identification ∗
نویسنده
چکیده
We study the outcome of the amendment voting procedure based on a potentially incomplete preference relation. A decision-maker evaluates candidates in a list and iteratively updates her choice by comparing the status-quo to the next candidate. She favors the status-quo when the two candidates are incomparable according to her underlying preference. Developing a revealed preference approach, we characterize all choice functions that can arise from such a procedure and discuss to what extent the underlying preference can be identified from observed choices. JEL Classification: D11
منابع مشابه
Amendment Voting with Incomplete Preferences ∗
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