Explaining institutional arrangements in telecommunications regulation: an empirical analysis Explaining institutional arrangements in telecommunications regulation: an empirical analysis

There is a significant degree of regulatory fragmentation in telecommunications to the extent that at least a telecommunications or industry-specific agency (ISA) and the antitrust agency (AA) coincide in enforcing rules in this business. In this paper, I analyze the determinants of the institutional arrangements observed between the institutions involved in telecommunications regulation corresponding to a crosscountry sample (26 countries of the OECD area). I find that the determining factors for preferring more involvement of the ISA are generally related to explicit and implicit safeguards against its problems of enforcement transparency or administrative control. Similarly, the determining factors for preferring more involvement of the AA are implicit safeguards against its effectiveness “disadvantage” for performing regulation in a complex business. Finally, alternative explanations associated to regulatory credibility and importance of social goals among others are also controlled JEL-classification: L40, L51, L96