Believing, Holding True, and Accepting
نویسنده
چکیده
You do not know who this Zhuangzi is, not even if it is the name of a man; you don’t know either what a shi or a cheng is. But on the basis of the author's authority, you believe that the sentence “Zhuangzi's principle is that you cannot get a shi without having a cheng” is true. You do not understand this sentence, for you do not know what it means, therefore you don't believe that Zhuangzi's principle is that you cannot get a shi without having a cheng. Nevertheless you believe the sentence to be true. But how can you believe that a sentence is true without believing what it says? That seems paradoxical, because it leads to a version of Moore's paradox. You have:
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