Randomization devices and the elicitation of ambiguity-averse preferences
نویسنده
چکیده
In random incentive mechanisms agents choose from multiple problems and a randomization device selects a single problem to determine payment. Agents are assumed to act as if they faced each problem on its own. While this approach is valid when agents are expected utility maximizers, ambiguity-averse agents may use the randomization device to hedge and thereby contaminate the data.
منابع مشابه
Independent Randomization Devices and the Elicitation of Ambiguity Averse Preferences
Random incentive mechanisms are an important tool of experimental economics. According to such mechanisms subjects are asked to choose from a variety of problems, but are paid according to only one randomly drawn problem. I show that subjects’ choices in random incentive mechanisms and single choice experiments are identical if they view the randomization device that determines the choice probl...
متن کاملExperimental Elicitation of Ambiguity Attitude Using the Random Incentive System
We demonstrate how the standard usage of the random incentive system in ambiguity experiments is not incentive compatible if the decision maker is ambiguity averse. We propose a slight modification of the procedure in which the randomization takes place before decisions are made and the state is realized and prove that if subjects evaluate the experimental environment in that way (first risk, s...
متن کاملStochastically independent randomization and uncertainty aversion
This paper proposes a preference-based condition for stochastic independence of a randomizing device in a product state space. This condition is applied to investigate some classes of preferences that allow for both independent randomization and uncertainty or ambiguity aversion (a la Ellsberg). For example, when imposed on Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) preferences in a Savage framework displa...
متن کاملA class of incomplete and ambiguity averse preferences
The Working Papers should not be reported as representing the views of the Banco Central do Brasil. The views expressed in the papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Banco Central do Brasil. This paper characterizes ambiguity averse preferences in the absence of the completeness axiom. We axiomatize multiple selves versions of some of the most important ex...
متن کاملRange convexity and ambiguity averse preferences
We show that range convexity of beliefs, a ‘technical’ condition that appears naturally in axiomatizations of preferences in a Savage-like framework, imposes some unexpected restrictions when modelling ambiguity averse preferences. That is, when it is added to a mild condition, range convexity makes the preferences collapse to subjective expected utility as soon as they satisfy structural condi...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 159 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015